Abstract. We are interested in the design of policies for virtual communities of agents based on the grid infrastructure. In a virtual community agents can play both the role of resource consumers and the role of resource providers, and they remain in control of their resources. We argue that this requirement imposes a distinction between the authorization to access a resource given by the virtual community and the permission to do so issued by the resource providers. Our model is based on a logical multiagent framework that distinguishes the three roles of resource consumption, provision, and of authorization.
Introduction
Pearlman et al. [14] define a virtual community on the grid infrastructure as a large, multi-institutional group of individuals who use a set of rules, a policy, to specify how to share their resources, such as disk space, bandwidth, data, online services, etc. Policies in virtual communities become more complex than in distributed systems due to, e.g.:
-Every agent in the community can play both the role of a resource consumer as well as that of a resource provider. Resource providers retain the control of their resources and they specify in local policies the conditions of use of their resources. -When there is a central manager, it permits agents to access the resources which it owns and controls, according to the policies defined by itself. In contrast, in virtual communities, access control cannot be directly implemented since none owns all the resources. -Resource providers implement local access control according to the community's security policies. However, they should not be overburdened by the task of updating the policies as they change and new members join the community. -Agents who participate to the community are heterogeneous and change frequently, so they cannot be assumed to be always cooperative and to stick to the system policies, as concerns both requesting access to resources and providing access to their resources.
The problem of designing policies for virtual communities has been recently raised, e.g., by Pearlman et al. [14] and Sadighi Firozabadi and Sergot [18] . Pearlman et al. [14] argue that the solution is "to allow resource owners to grant access to blocks of resources to a community as a whole, and let the community itself manage fine-grained access control within that framework". The centralized management of resources owned by the single resource providers is performed by a Community Authorization Service: "A community runs a CAS server to keep track of its membership and fine-grained access control policies. A user wishing to access community resources contacts the CAS server, which delegates rights to the user based on the request and the user's role within the community. These rights are in the form of capabilities which users can present at a resource to gain access on behalf of the community", [14] .
Moreover, new questions are raised, like whether the task of authorizing requests performed by the CAS is identical to the task performed by a resource provider when it permits access, and what is the relation between these two agents.
In this paper we address the problem how in virtual communities policies composed by prohibitions, permissions and authorizations can be designed. Two subproblems of such a model are:
1. How should permissions and authorizations be distinguished and how are they related? 2. How can a resource provider delegate to the CAS the power of authorizing resource consumers and why can the power to issue permissions not be delegated?
We analyze this distinction using our framework for multiagent normative systems presented in [1] , [3] , [5] , [6] .
The process of accessing a resource in a virtual community, as described by Pearlman et al. [14] is as follows. When a resource provider a 3 wants to join a community, it informs the CAS a 2 , which replies with the requirements on how its resource must be shared with the community. When a resource consumer a 1 wants to access the resource of agent a 3 , it must not only authenticate itself with agent a 2 providing its credentials, but it must also get a proof that its request conforms to the community's access policy. This proof is expressed by a capability (e.g., a X.509 certificate) provided by agent a 2 to a 1 , which identifies the agent and states that it is authorized to access the resource. Now, agent a 1 can make the actual request to a 3 , forwarding it the capability. After checking the truthfulness of the capability, agent a 3 replies to a 1 .
In a virtual community, agent a 3 maintains the control of its resource: the request is granted only if it is also permitted by the local policy of agent a 3 . Hence, the authorization by agent a 2 contained in the capability is not enough for agent a 1 's request being granted.
In this paper, we argue that the authorization issued by the CAS is conceptually different from the permission granted by the resource provider and that the resource provider delegates to the CAS the power to issue authorizations rather then to issue permissions, since the latter power requires being in control of a resource.
A cue that these notions have different properties is found also in the ordinary use of the terms authorization and permission. E.g., for the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary [15] permitting is "to allow something", "to make it possible for someone to do something, or to not prevent something from happening", while authorizing means "to give someone official permission to do something". Moreover, dictionaries of law like [8] argue that authorizations and permissions are related but different concepts, and that authorizations do not create new permissions.
The notion of authorization to access a resource and the notion of permission should be kept distinct to have a correct model of the situation and to prevent dangerous misunderstandings in designing access policies. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the notion of authorization, and in Section 3 we introduce the formal agent model and and the definition of norms, authorizations and delegation. Moreover, in Section 3.4, we discuss a scenario where the formal model is applied, and in Section 4 we discuss the theoretical foundations of the design and we summarize the results of the paper.
Authorization
Consider the following example. An agent a 3 joins some virtual community; it will both use the resources provided by the community, say downloading shared files, and provide its resource to the other members of the community, say some of its disk space to store files: agent a 3 plays both the role of a resource consumer, c(a 3 ) , and that of a resource provider, p(a 3 ). Since agent p(a 3 ) controls its disk space (it is the only one who can decide that storing or retrieving files take place), it regulated the access to the disk by means of some local policy: prohibitions and permissions. E.g., it prohibited to read files during the day and it prohibited to store files exceeding 2.5Mb.
When agent a 3 joins the community, it agrees that also some other members use its disk space resource. In principle, agent p(a 3 ) could modify the norms regulating the access to its resource: e.g., by maintaining the prohibitions to read file during the day and to store large files, and by adding the permission about which members of the community can store and retrieve files on its disk space. However, this solution imposes an heavy burden. In fact, even if the problem of authenticating which are the current users of the community can be dealt with by some trusted third party who gives them e-certificates, it remains the problem of which members of the community are the ones which the community currently wants that they can access the resource and under which conditions they can do so. Moreover, the community's access policies may change with time, so that agent p(a 3 ) should be kept informed and should modify the norms regulating access to the resource it owns. The complexity of modifications could also introduce unwanted errors in the access policy of agent p(a 3 ).
What is needed is a solution which transfers the burden of managing the community policies to other agents, playing the role of authorities, which have the knowledge and resources to perform this task. However, it is impossible to say that an authority u(a 2 ) changes the prohibitions and permissions posed by agent p(a 3 ): in our model ( [3] ) norms are defined in terms of goals of agent p(a 3 ), and authorities cannot change the goals of an autonomous agent. Moreover, u(a 2 ) is not in control of the resource so it cannot impose sanctions to motivate the respect of prohibitions. Finally, agent p(a 3 ) wants to preserve its autonomy, so that it does not accept that someone else can change the norms regulating access to its resource.
The solution is that agent p(a 3 ) creates a permission saying that authorized agents can access the resource. But the decision to authorize agents to access the resource is delegated to the authority u(a 2 ) which has up to date knowledge on the system policies and members. Delegating the decision to authorize is easier than delegating permissions: the authorization is not a goal of the agent p(a 3 ) but just a belief which can be induced by the authority by issuing e-certificates and capabilities to the agents which are authorized. Moreover, it does not require that the delegated agent is in control of the resource.
When the set of agents which can be authorized changes as a consequence of new community policies, agent p(a 3 ) does not have to change the norms regulating access: new authorizations are created when the authority u(a 2 ) issues new capabilities (or, in our abstract terminology, u(a 2 ) declares them authorized). The capabilities are recognized by agent p(a 3 ) as the proof that the permission to access the resource applies to a consumer c(a 1 ) requesting access to it.
Authorizations, thus, are the means used by authorities to regulate the access of consumers to resources which they do not control. But there is no way to make authorized users access a resource without a permission by the resource provider which controls the resource: hence, authorizations are distinct from and presuppose permissions. An authorization is useless unless the resource provider permits authorized agents to access the resource it controls: authorizations change what is prohibited to an agent and legitimate an action but without introducing or removing any norm.
In summary, the key notions are:
Prohibition is defined as a goal of resource providers. This is paraphrased as: Your wish (goal, desire) is my command (prohibition). The unfulfillment of the goal is considered as a violation and is sanctioned.
Permission is behavior which not considered by a provider as a violation and thus it is not sanctioned. The main role of permissions is to provide exceptions to prohibitions in a given context.
Authorization is a belief of a provider which appears as a condition in some permission it issued.
Declaration of authorization is an action of an authority which states that an agent can be considered authorized according to its own policy.
Delegation is the change of authority. The declaration turns into a belief of the resource provider that an agent is authorized. A provider delegates the authority when it joins the community.
Using Searle [20] 's terminology, in [6] , we say that a declaration generates an actual authorization if it "counts as" an authorization for the resource provider.
Nothing requires that agent u(a 2 ), who is delegated the authority to authorize other agents, is itself permitted nor authorized nor delegated to authorize itself. The separation of institutional power from the permission to exercise it, identified by Makinson [13] , is important for virtual communities; an organization could, e.g., outsource some administrative task such as assigning access rights to some agent without allowing it to have those access rights.
A formal model

Individual agent design
For the individual agent design we are inspired by the BOID architecture [7] ; though, in contrast to the BOID architecture, prohibitions are not taken as primitive concept. Beliefs, desires and goals are represented by conditional rules. Actions, called decision variables, can have conditional and indirect effects with a non-monotonic character.
In virtual communities there is no separation of resource providers from resource consumers, and they can play the role of authorities too. So we introduce a single set of agents, which can each play one or more roles: Next decisions. We assume that the base language contains boolean variables and logical connectives. The variables are either decision variables of an agent, which represent the agent's actions and whose truth value is directly determined by it, or parameters, which describe the state of the world and whose truth value can only be determined indirectly. Our terminology is borrowed from Lang et al. [11] . Institutional facts, a subset of the parameters, represent the legal classification of reality made by agents. 
Definition 2 (Decisions). Let
We express these agent characteristics by a priority relation on the rules which encode, as detailed in Broersen et al. [7] , how the agent resolves its conflicts.
Definition 4 (Motivational states). The motivational state
M i of agent a i 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a tuple D i , G i , ≥ i , where D i , G i are
sets of rules, ≥ i is a transitive and reflexive relation on the powerset of D i ∪ G i containing at least the subset relation.
The decision process of an agent a i tries to minimize (according to the ordering ≥ i on goal and desire rules) the goal and desire rules in G i and D i which remain unsatisfied given a certain decision d i .
Definition 5 (Unfulfilled motivational states). Let U (R, s) be the unfulfilled rules of state
s, U (R, s)={l 1 ∧. . .∧l n →l ∈ R | {l 1 , .
. . , l n } ⊆ s and l ∈s}
The unfulfilled mental state description of agent a i is
Example 2. Given the motivational state of agent a
In calculating which are the effects of a decision d i given an initial state s, the agent uses the belief rules B i and the ordering on them ≥ B i to resolve the possible conflicts. Moreover, agent a i must predict the decisions of the agents acting after itself by recursively modelling ( [9] ) them using the information on their belief, goal and desire rules captured by their motivational states. The reader can find the details of the qualitative decision model in [3] .
Norms
Prohibitions and permissions are defined in terms of goals and desires of the bearer of the norm and of the normative role, together with two auxiliary concepts.
The first concept is violation. The normative role can decide whether something is considered a violation or not.
Definition 6 (Violation variables). The violation variables of agent p(a j ) are a subset of the decision variables of p(a j ) written as
V j ={V i j (x) | x a
literal built out of a propositional variable in P ∪ A i }: x is a violation by agent c(a i ).
The second concept is sanction. Since it is not possible to assume that all agents are cooperative and respect the norms, sanctions provide motivations to fulfill the norms. A sanction is an action negatively affecting an agent, i.e., the agent desires the absence of the sanction.
Definition 7 (Conditional prohibition with sanction). Agent c(a i ) is prohibited by agent p(a j ) to decide to do x (a literal built out of a variable in P ∪ A i ) with sanction s (a propositional variable) under condition q (a proposition),
F (i,j) (x, s | q), iff: 1. q → ¬x ∈ G j :
if agent p(a j ) believes that q it has as a goal that agent c(a i ) adopts
¬x as its decision.
to recognize x as a violation done by agent c(a i ).
V
i j (x) → s ∈ G j : if agent p(a j ) decides V i j (x) then
it has as a goal that it sanctions agent c(a i
).
4.
→ ¬s ∈ D i : agent c(a i ) has the desire not to be sanctioned.
A permission to do x is an exception to a prohibition to do x if agent p(a j ) has the goal that x does not count as a violation under some condition.
Definition 8 (Conditional permission). Agent c(a i ) is permitted by agent p(a j ) to decide to do x (a literal built out of a propositional variable in P ∪
A i ) under condition q (a proposition), P (i,j) (x | q), iff -q ∧ x → ¬V i j (x) ∈ G j : if agent p(a j ) believes q ∧ x then
it wants that x is not considered a violation done by agent c(a i ).
The permission overrides the prohibition if the goal that something does not count as a violation (q ∧ x → ¬V i j (x)) has higher priority in the ordering on goal and desire rules ≥ j with respect to the goal of a corresponding prohibition that x is considered as a violation ( 
We do not consider here the problem of how normative role's characteristics can be generated; e.g., see [4] for a discussion of the problem of the legal sources of norms.
Resource, authorization and delegation
We introduce now the notion of resource, of control of a resource, of authorization and delegation of the institutional power to authorize access to a resource.
An agent who manipulates a resource by means of some action is called a resource consumer: Definition 9 (Resources). Let RS be a set of resources. Let RA j = {f j (r) | r ∈ RS} be a set of resource actions of agent c(a j ) on r ∈ RS.
The possibility to punish violations by means of some sanction s is among the preconditions for creating a prohibition; for this reason, it appears in the notion of controlling a resource, which is a precondition for issuing norms concerning access control. Agent p(a j ) controls a resource action f i of  agent c(a i ) on resource r ∈ RS, control j (f i (r) An agent who controls a resource is a resource provider. As a particular case, s = ¬p can be a literal built out of a parameter representing the failure of accessing a resource: e.g., reading a file has the desired effect of knowing the content of the file, and blocking the reading action results in the impossibility of knowing the information contained in the file. c(a i ) believes that p(a j ) with m ∈ A j prevents to achieve the effect p of
Definition 10 (Control of resource).
Besides issuing norms, an agent which controls a resource can consider other agents authorized to access the resource it controls; authorizations, are a legal classification of reality for agents, and, thus, are represented by institutional facts:
Definition 11 (Authorizations). Let the institutional facts I contain a set of so-called authorization variables:
H j ={u j (f i (r)) | a i ∈A and f i (r)∈RA i and control j (f i (r))}
They are institutional facts representing that the resource provider p(a j ) considers agent c(a i ) authorized to access r with action f i . An authorization has a meaning only if it appears among the conditions of a permission.
Instead, declaring an agent authorized does not have the requirement to control a resource:
Definition 12 (Declarations). Let the decision variables of agent u(a k ) contain a set of so-called declaration variables
The point of declaring agents authorized is that a declaration generates an actual authorization if it counts as as an authorization for the normative role controlling the resource. An example of this relation is the fact that a signature by the head of the department on a purchase order counts as the institutional commitment of the department to pay for that order: the head of the department has the institutional power to buy on behalf of the department. counts-as q, q a literal built out of a parameter, for agent p(a j ), counts-as j (x, q) , iff:
Definition 13 (Counts as relation). A decision variable
believes that x has q as a consequence.
An agent who has been delegated the institutional power to authorize access is called an authority. It is not requested to control any resource. Agent u(a k ) is delegated by agent p(a j )  the institutional power to authorize agent c(a i ) to do f i (r) ∈ RA i by means of declaration
Definition 14 (Delegation of authorization).
g k (f i (r)) ∈ T k (u j (f i (r)) ∈ H j ), Del (k,j) (g k (f i (r)), u j (f i (r))), iff: -counts-as j (g k (f i (r)), u j (f i (r)))
Applicative scenarios
In this section we sketch an applicative scenario in our model in the context of a virtual community. As shown in Figure 1 we have three agents: agent a 3 , a provider p(a 3 ) of resource f (a file), the resource consumer c(a 1 ), and the CAS agent a 2 : an authority u(a 2 ). Agent p(a 3 ) can block c(a 1 )'s attempt of accessing with action r 1 (r 1 (f )) the resource, since it is in control of the resource. When agent p(a 3 ) joined the community (step 1) it maintained the prohibition to access f (F (1,3) (r 1 (f ), ¬inf o(f ) | )) but it agreed to share r 1 (f ) the resource with the other members of the community by means of a permission to do r 1 (f ). Unfortunately, p(a 3 ) does not know which are the current members (in this case whether agent a 1 is a member) nor which is the access policy of the community for what concerns the resource f which p(a 3 ) is sharing. Thus, agent p(a 3 ) decides to consider what agent u(a 2 ) says (or declares, in our terminology: g 2 (r 1 (f )) ∈ T 2 ) about c(a 1 )'s access to f as an authorization u 3 (r 1 (f )) by itself: u(a 2 )'s action g 2 (r 1 (f )) counts as u 3 (r 1 (f )) ∈ H 3 for p(a 3 ). Then it permit agent c(a 1 ) to access only if it is authorized: P (1,3) (r 1 (f )|u 3 (r 1 (f ))).
Agent c(a 1 ) compares the different alternatives for achieving its goal of knowing the content of the file inf o(f ): requesting the resource by doing r 1 (f ) alone (step 5) or first asking agent u(a 2 ) for a declaration (ask 1 (g 2 (r 1 (f ))))(3) and then requesting to access the resource (5) . It knows that a request for access is considered as a violation V (r 1 (f ), c(a 1 )) by agent p(a 3 ) and, thus, sanctioned by negating the information contained in the file (¬ (inf o(f )) ). For this reason, it decides to ask agent u(a 2 ) for an authorization to access agent p(a 3 )'s resource. Agent u(a 2 ) will provide c(a 1 ) with the declaration since it is a goal of the u(a 2 ) to cooperate with resource providers in enforcing the policy (ask 1 (g 2 (r 1 (f ))) → g 2 (r 1 (f )) ∈ G 2 ). Finally, agent c(a 1 ) knows that the declaration g 2 (r 1 (f )) of agent u(a 2 ) is considered as an authorization u 3 (r 1 (f ) by agent p(a 3 ): g 2 (r 1 (f )) → u 3 (r 1 (f )) ∈ B 3 .
Summary and discussion
We discuss policies for in virtual communities based on the distinction of the notions of permission and authorization. Our approach distinguishes three roles for each agent: as a resource provider, a resource consumer and authority.
The role played by the CAS in virtual communities can be formalized in terms of what we called the authority role. However, Pearlman et al. [14] use the term 'right' both for the authorizations provided by the CAS and the permissions granted by the resource providers: "the user effectively gets the intersection of the set of rights granted to the community by the resource provider and the set of rights defined by the capability granted to the user by the community."
This use of the terms right, authorization and permission as synonyms is frequent in policies for managing access control in distributed systems (e.g., [12] ). In this paper we show why and how these concepts should be kept distinct in the context of virtual communities.
The necessity of a fine grained analysis of the concepts of permission and authorization in the security policy field is witnessed also by Sadighi Firozabadi and Sergot [17] who argue that a mere permission given by the resource provider to access a resource which it controls must be distinguished from the entitlement to access the resource: an agent is entitled and not merely permitted when the policies regulating the virtual community prohibit the resource provider not to permit the agent to access the resource.
Another distinction comes from deontic logic. Jones and Sergot [10] distinguish permissions from powers in the sense of having been delegated the institutional power to do something: "when we say that the Head of Department is authorized 1 to purchase equipment, we mean first and foremost that he has been granted by the institution the power to enter valid purchase agreements". Instead, "sometimes when we say that an agent is authorized to do such-and-such we mean no more than that he has been granted permission to do it".
Law studies argue that a further distinction must be drawn also in this last sense of the term authorization as mere permission. The [8] 's dictionary of law argues that adding or removing an authorization does not change the normative status of an agent while a new permission does; i.e., authorizations do not change the norms (prohibitions and permissions), an agent is subject to; rather, authorizations lift the legal obstacles and limitations, thus legitimating an action of the agent: they change the sphere of what is prohibited or permitted to the agent without adding or removing norms. This is possible since norms have a conditional character so that what is currently considered as a violation or not depends on which are the norms that have their conditions satisfied in the current situation. The fact that authorizations do not modify the existing norms, but change what is prohibited and permitted to an agent anyway, means that authorizations enable the conditions of some permissions. Hence, the institutional power to authorize can be delegated to other agents who do not directly control the resources, since creating an authorization does not require to change prohibitions and permissions.
Some scholars argue, instead, that the power to create permissions can be delegated. [19] , for example, propose a framework where this power can be delegated as any other power to create institutional facts. We show in this paper that once prohibitions and permissions are not considered as primitive logical entities, the preconditions for their creation emerge. When we define them in terms of goals of the normative role, it emerges that controlling a resource is necessary for issuing a norm.
In Section 1, we highlighted that according to Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary [15] officiality seems to be the first dimension distinguishing permissions from authorizations: the official character of authorizations depends on the fact that they are institutional facts, and this character distinguishes them from permissions; an authorization is an institutional fact which appears among the conditions of some permission issued by a normative role: if the normative role believes this fact, the permission is enabled so that what is permitted in the current situation is changed by the authorization. The creation of institutional facts is a commonplace feature of legal systems and normgoverned organizations. According to [10] , "it is that particular agents are empowered to create certain types of states by mean of the performance of specific types of acts. Typically, the states created will have a normative character".
An authority has been delegated the power to create an institutional fact if the institution recognizes the authority's action as counting as something else (as in Searle [20] 's construction of social reality). E.g., the fact that an authority declares an agent authorized counts as an authorization by a normative role. For Jones and Sergot [10] , the counts as relation expresses the fact that a state of affairs or an action of an agent "is a sufficient condition to guarantee that the institution creates some (usually normative) state of affairs". As [10] suggest this relation can be considered as "constraints of (operative in) [an] institution". [10] express them as conditionals embedded in a modal operator.
